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 PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
THE NOT-SO-UNITARY EXECUTIVE
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL†
“I’m a little puzzled. I’m being told that I can’t just make a decision
and have it promptly executed, that the Department can’t just salute
smartly and go execute whatever decision I make. Why is that?”
—President George H. W. Bush1
INTRODUCTION
The exigencies of the times powerfully influence conceptions of
the proper scope of presidential power. In times of war or other na-
tional emergency, citizens expect strong leadership from the presi-
dent in his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In the
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States, presidential power is at its zenith as Congress and the public
unite behind President George W. Bush’s efforts to respond to the
unprovoked slaughter of thousands of civilians on American soil.
Although the president’s powers as commander-in-chief are ex-
pansive, there are constitutional bounds. Even in wartime presidents
can overstep the limits of their constitutional authority in pursuit of
seemingly important ends. President Truman’s attempt during the
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1. DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY 68 (2001) (quoting President George H. W. Bush at a White House meet-
ing in January 1993 on regulations to implement the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act).
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Korean War to seize American steel mills to prevent a strike from
crippling the economy was declared illegal by the Supreme Court in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer2 because it had not been
authorized by Congress. This decision remains one of the Court’s few
pronouncements on the subject of constitutional limits on presiden-
tial power. Yet this topic will remain the subject of seemingly endless
debate because of its continuing importance to understanding the
structure of our government. Although this debate often acquires a
distinctly partisan tinge, particularly when the White House and
Congress are controlled by different political parties,3 it is vitally im-
portant, for the debate raises issues that go to the very heart of our
constitutional scheme.
Much of the contemporary debate over presidential power has
been spawned by continuing competition between Congress and the
president for influence over administrative agencies. The enactment
of numerous federal regulatory statutes to protect consumers, work-
ers, the environment, the economy, and the civil rights of our citi-
zenry has placed enormous authority in the hands of administrative
agencies charged by law with responsibility for translating statutory
directives into regulatory standards. From the dawn of the adminis-
trative state, the three branches of government have engaged in spir-
ited competition to influence the policies adopted by agency officials.
Given the vast scope of the duties invested in the federal bureauc-
racy, some scholars have argued that “the system of shared powers
created by the constitution” has been transformed into “a system of
shared influence over bureaucratic decisionmaking.”4
Some regulatory entities, such as the Federal Trade Commission,
were created as independent agencies that are not subject to the same
2. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. When control of the White House shifts from one party to another, it is fascinating to
observe how quickly advocates can switch sides in articulating their visions of the proper scope
of presidential authority. See, e.g., Jeanne Cummings, Bush Seeks to Buttress Defenses of the
Executive Branch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2001, at A24 (discussing President George W. Bush’s
attempts to restore presidential powers by rebutting demands for information by the General
Accounting Office and invoking executive privilege in response to subpoenas from House
committees); Walter Dellinger, The Wrong Way to Oppose, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2001, at A22
(cautioning Democrats against using the same tactics Republicans used in opposing President
Clinton).
4. Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 428 (1989) (quoting CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 403
(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987)).
PERCIVAL.DOC 02/05/02 10:36 AM
2001] NOT-SO-UNITARY EXECUTIVE 965
degree of presidential control as other executive agencies.5 Presiden-
tial efforts to influence decisions by nonindependent agencies have
raised a fundamental legal question that goes to the heart of debates
over presidential power: does the president have the legal authority
to dictate regulatory decisions entrusted by statute to the heads of
executive agencies? Most, though not all, federal regulatory statutes
specify that regulations are to be promulgated by the heads of execu-
tive agencies. Because the president appoints (and can remove) these
officials, he can have enormous influence over their policy decisions.
But does this imply that the president has the power to dictate the
substance of regulatory decisions that agencies are required by law to
make?
The conventional wisdom is that the president does not have
such authority.6 Thus, recent presidents’ regulatory review programs
have avoided express assertions of such authority.7 These regulatory
review programs generally have been premised on the notion that the
president lacks the power to displace decisionmaking authority
granted by statute to agency officials. Although proponents of a “uni-
tary executive” theory claim that the president’s constitutional role as
chief executive should give him unqualified executive power, includ-
ing the authority to dictate agency decisions,8 review of the legal and
5. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935) (holding that, al-
though a president has unrestrained power to remove purely executive officers, such power
does not extend to offices where Congress statutorily limited removal to certain causes).
6. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the Limits of the Regulatory Review
Authority of the Office of Management and Budget, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,017, 10,017 (1987)
(discussing the Office of Management and Budget’s alleged abuse of the regulatory process and
the resulting debate about presidential authority over agency rulemaking); Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (remarking
that, even if an official risks losing his job over an action contrary to the president’s will, the
decision technically remains in the official’s hands); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 649 (1984)
(explaining that Congress can choose by statute to place the responsibility for decisions with
the agency rather than the president); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 201 (1986) (noting that
the only real power a president has over appointed officials is that of removal, which is limited
by political constraints).
7. The executive orders establishing regulatory review programs have been careful not to
assert presidential authority to displace agency decisionmaking authority. See, e.g., Exec. Order
No. 12,866 § 9, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (“Nothing in this
order shall be construed as displacing the agencies’ authority or responsibilities, as authorized
by law.”); Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982) (“Nothing in this subsec-
tion shall be construed as displacing the agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.”).
8. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 29 (1994) (discussing how changed circumstances may impact society’s
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policy considerations raised by this issue leads to a contrary conclu-
sion.
This Essay argues that although the president’s ability to remove
agency heads gives him enormous power to influence their decisions,
it does not give him the authority to dictate substantive decisions en-
trusted to them by law. When Congress enacts regulatory legislation
vesting decisionmaking authority in agency heads, it generally envi-
sions that decisions will be made by persons who possess expertise in
the regulatory matters entrusted to them. Although the president’s
ability to appoint agency heads and to fire those who defy him makes
public dissent by agency officials extremely rare, this dissent none-
theless can provide a highly valuable check on abuses of presidential
power.
Part I of this Essay examines the scope of presidential power
over decisionmaking by executive agencies. It considers what can be
inferred from the sparse constitutional text and from the structure of
government it erects, the most distinctive feature of which is the
separation of powers. Part II then discusses how the first Congress,
which included many of the Constitution’s Framers, addressed ques-
tions concerning the president’s authority over agencies when it en-
acted legislation establishing them. Part III reviews historical prac-
tices, including the history of presidential efforts to influence
rulemaking and attempts by Congress and the judiciary to counter
such influence. It examines congressional efforts to vest power in
agency heads and to limit the president’s authority to remove them.
It also discusses presidential efforts to assert greater management
authority over executive agencies, including the regulatory review
programs employed by every president since Richard Nixon. Part IV
then explores policy considerations that counsel against giving the
president authority to dictate decisions entrusted by statute to execu-
tive officers.
notions about the appropriate scope of presidential power); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna
B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 603–35 (1994) (ar-
guing that the Framers intended to have a single person in charge of executing all federal laws).
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I.  PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Textualist Argument
The text of the Constitution says very little about the role of the
president in managing administrative agencies. Article II, Section 1
of the Constitution states that “The executive Power shall be vested
in the President of the United States of America.”9 Although this
provision does not specify what the executive power is, at least in the
domestic arena, it surely reflects a considered decision to lodge ulti-
mate authority for such power in a single individual. Following a vig-
orous debate over the dangers of accumulating too much power in a
single person, delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on
June 4, 1787, by a margin of seven states to three, to establish the
presidency, rejecting proposals to create some kind of executive
council instead.10 By placing executive authority in a single person,
the Framers sought to create a chief executive who would be ener-
getic, effective, and accountable.11
Eschewing the use of a plural executive to prevent abuses of ex-
ecutive power, the Framers relied instead on a structural separation
of executive, judicial, and legislative powers among three branches of
government subject to an elaborate system of checks and balances.12
One important check on presidential power was the chief executive’s
need to rely on Congress to enact legislation establishing executive
agencies. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the president
the power of appointment to offices “which shall be established by
law.”13 Because Congress must enact laws to establish these offices,
“the executive departments are creatures, not of the Constitution di-
rectly, but of Congressional statutes.”14 The Constitution’s descrip-
tion of Congress’s legislative authority in Article I, Section 8’s Neces-
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
10. See Theodore B. Olson, The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential
Authority, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH 225, 226 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (detailing the Framers’
debate whether to create a unitary executive or a more diversified system).
11. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (outlining the advantages of a single executive).
12. Strauss, supra note 6, at 599 (arguing that separation of powers should be viewed more
liberally as a separation of functions).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
14. JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 189 (1925).
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sary and Proper Clause suggests that the Framers envisioned that cer-
tain powers could be vested directly in executive departments or offi-
cers. This Clause provides Congress with the authority to enact laws
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”15 Thus, under the Constitution, “the functions, powers, and
duties of the heads of such departments are defined by Congress, in
broad terms or minutely as to it seem best.”16
The only other references in the Constitution to the president’s
executive authority are contained in Article II, Section 3’s directive
that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted”17 and in Article II, Section 2’s grant of authority to the presi-
dent to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices.”18 These provisions suggest that the
president has some supervisory authority over the heads of executive
agencies that may be useful in fulfilling his obligation to execute the
laws.
The president’s appointment and removal powers and the Fram-
ers’ decision to vest executive authority in the president presumably
give him considerable ability to influence decisions by executive offi-
cers. However, this does not provide a compelling case for concluding
that the president may dictate decisions entrusted by Congress to the
heads of executive agencies. Article II, Section 2’s requirement that
presidential appointments of executive officers be subject to the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate19 would have little meaning if the
president simply could dictate the decisions such officers are required
by law to make. By requiring Senate confirmation of the president’s
nominees to head cabinet agencies, the Constitution presumably en-
visions that these officers will have some degree of independence that
makes it necessary for them to be acceptable not only to the presi-
dent, but also to the Senate, one of the entities largely responsible for
defining the powers, duties, and functions of their agencies. Moreo-
ver, if the president had authority to dictate the substance of agency
15. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
16. HART, supra note 14, at 189.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
18. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
19. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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decisions, why would the Framers have found it necessary to ex-
pressly grant him the authority to demand opinions in writing from
executive officers? Thus, from the text of the Constitution one could
envision “a supervisory, perhaps even caretaker presidential role, in
relationship to shadowy ‘executive departments’ from which opinions
might be sought.”20
By failing to specify in any detail the role of executive agencies
in the constitutional scheme they created, the Framers left consider-
able room for competition between the three branches of govern-
ment for influence over the work of the bureaucracy. Some scholars
believe that this creative tension is precisely what the Framers had
hoped to produce to provide further checks and balances to prevent
any single branch from acquiring too much power.21
B. Separation of Powers
The most distinctive feature of the governmental structure
erected by the Constitution is its separation of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial functions into three branches of government. This
separation of powers reflects a conscious effort to diffuse authority to
prevent abuses of power. Inherent in this division of power is the no-
tion that the president must respect statutory commands even when
they require a result contrary to his own policy preferences. Thus, if
there is a conflict between fidelity to a presidential directive and fi-
delity to a law enacted by Congress, agency heads must comply with
the law. The Constitution instructs the president to exercise his ex-
ecutive authority in accordance with law. Article II, Section 3’s direc-
tive that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed”22 confirms that the president must comply with laws en-
acted by Congress. Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution vests the
executive power in the president. But this executive power does not
include the authority for the president unilaterally to change the law
without legislative action by Congress. The clearest example of this is
provided by the Court’s decision in the Steel Seizure Case.23
The Steel Seizure Case was spawned by President Truman’s deci-
sion on April 8, 1952, to issue Executive Order 10,340, directing the
secretary of commerce to seize eighty-eight private steel mills to pre-
20. Strauss, supra note 6, at 598.
21. See id. at 604 (suggesting that mixed powers would preserve liberty).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952).
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vent an impending nationwide strike from crippling steel production
during the Korean War.24 In his biography of President Truman,
David McCullough reports that prior to joining the Supreme Court,
Justice Tom Clark, who had been Truman’s attorney general, had ad-
vised Truman that the president had “inherent” power to prevent pa-
ralysis of the economy in the face of a national strike in a critical in-
dustry.25 McCullough also reports that the sitting Chief Justice, Fred
Vinson, had advised Truman in confidence that he legally could seize
the steel mills to prevent the strike.26
Truman’s decision to seize the steel mills was condemned widely
in the media. At a press conference Truman was asked whether he
thought the president had inherent power to seize radio and televi-
sion stations during a crisis.27 When he refused to rule out such a pos-
sibility, Truman compounded his public relations problems.28 A fed-
eral district judge quickly ruled the president’s action illegal, noting
that even a steel strike’s “awful results[] would be less injurious to the
public than the injury which would flow from a timorous judicial rec-
ognition that there is some basis for this claim to unlimited and unre-
strained Executive power.”29
The Supreme Court promptly agreed to hear the case, and on
June 2, 1952, it affirmed the district court’s decision by a 6-3 vote
with Chief Justice Vinson dissenting.30 The Court rejected the notion
that presidential power to seize the steel mills could be implied from
Article II’s Vesting or Take Care Clauses or from the president’s
powers as commander-in-chief. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Black wrote that “[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the Presi-
dent’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”31 Black noted that the president’s
executive order did “not direct that a congressional policy be exe-
24. Id. at 583.
25. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 896–97 (1992).
26. Id. at 897. Truman was in need of legal advice because he had fired his attorney gen-
eral, J. Howard McGrath, just five days before the steel seizure. McGrath had fired a respected
Republican lawyer, Newbold Morris, who had been hired by the Justice Department to take
over an investigation of corruption at the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Id. at 894.
27. Id. at 899–900.
28. Id. at 900.
29. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D.D.C. 1952);
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 25, at 900.
30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (opinion of
Black, J.); id. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 587.
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cuted in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presiden-
tial policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.”32
While noting that Congress had the power “to adopt such public poli-
cies as those proclaimed by the order,” Black concluded that “[t]he
Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to
presidential or military supervision or control.”33
The Steel Seizure Case confirms that the very notion of executive
authority is founded in carrying out—executing—duties specified by
law. If a federal regulatory statute entrusts certain decisionmaking
responsibilities to the head of an executive agency, the president
must respect that delegation. That does not mean that the president
is prohibited from communicating with the agency head concerning
his preferences for how the decision should be made,34 unless the
statute requires that the decision be made through a formal adjudica-
tory process that bars ex parte contacts.35
For example, in Sierra Club v. Costle, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was no statutory prohibi-
tion on intraexecutive contacts during informal rulemaking, and it
endorsed the desirability of presidential supervision of rulemaking.36
Writing for the court, Judge Wald observed that:
Of course, it is always possible that undisclosed Presidential prod-
ding may direct an outcome that is factually based on the record, but
different from the outcome that would have obtained in the absence
of Presidential involvement. In such a case, it would be true that the
political process did affect the outcome in a way the courts could not
police. But we do not believe that Congress intended that the courts
convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technocratic process, un-
affected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential
power.37
Sierra Club v. Costle confirms that it is proper and desirable for
the president to monitor the actions of agencies and to offer his views
concerning what regulatory policies are appropriate.38 However, it
32. Id. at 588.
33. Id.
34. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405–06 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
35. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Or. Lands Coalition, 984 F.2d 1534, 1541 (9th Cir. 1993).
36. Costle, 657 F.2d at 404–08.
37. Id. at 408.
38. It is important to remember that Sierra Club v. Costle refers only to decisions made
through informal rulemaking. In Portland Audubon Society v. Oregon Lands Coalition, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Administrative Procedure Act prohibited efforts by the White
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does not indicate that the president may dictate regulatory outcomes
but, rather, only that if he is successful in influencing a decision it still
must be based on factual support in the rulemaking record.
After all, any rule issued here with or without White House assis-
tance must have the requisite factual support in the rulemaking rec-
ord, and under this particular statute the Administrator may not base
the rule in whole or in part on any “information or data” which is not
in the record, no matter what the source.39
The decision also implicitly recognizes limits on the president’s
supervisory authority. Judge Wald’s discussion of the relationship be-
tween the president and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) administrator appears to assume that the administrator re-
tains ultimate responsibility for making the regulatory decisions. She
noted that the administrator “needs to know the arguments” of
White House staff, not that she must ultimately adopt them.40 Judge
Wald recognized that the president may be successful in “prodding”
the administrator into adopting a different regulation than she origi-
nally contemplated, but she did not imply that the president has the
authority to dictate the result.41
Principles of separation of powers continue to serve as a check
on the exercise of presidential authority. During the administrations
of both President Clinton and President George W. Bush, courts have
applied the principles of the Steel Seizure Case to declare actions di-
rected by executive orders to be illegal. In Chamber of Commerce v.
Reich,42 the District of Columbia Circuit declared illegal an executive
order issued by President Clinton43 that directed federal agencies not
to do business with contractors who hire permanent replacements for
striking employees.44 Noting that the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) permits the hiring of permanent replacements for strikers,
House to influence a decision by members of an endangered species committee (also known as
the “God Squad”) because the committee hearings were adjudicatory hearings subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act’s prohibition on ex parte communications, including those from
the president and his staff. 984 F.2d at 1536. The court reasoned that a contrary result would
mean that the president “would effectively destroy the integrity of all federal agency adjudica-
tions.” Id. at 1546.
39. Costle, 657 F.2d at 407–08 (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. at 406.
41. Id. at 408.
42. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
43. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 3 C.F.R. 329 (1996).
44. 74 F.3d at 1324.
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the court reasoned that the Clinton executive order would upset the
balance struck by Congress on an issue that “surely goes to the heart
of United States labor relations policy.”45 Applying similar reasoning,
a federal district court recently ruled illegal an executive order46 is-
sued by President George W. Bush that prohibited federal contrac-
tors from using project labor agreements. The court reasoned that the
president lacked the authority under the Constitution and the Pro-
curement Act to bar such agreements and that the executive order
conflicted with the NLRA by prohibiting a practice that is legal un-
der the Act.47
II.  THE ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT
Further insight into the Framers’ views concerning the relation-
ship between the president and executive agencies can be obtained by
examining the records of the first federal Congress. When the first
Congress met in 1789 it faced the task of bringing to life the govern-
ment the new Constitution had created. Members of this first Con-
gress included many of the participants in the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787. One of the first orders of business for the new Congress
was to establish executive agencies. On the House floor, Representa-
tive Elias Boudinot of New Jersey was the first to raise this matter:
“If we take up the present constitution, we shall find it contemplates
departments of an executive nature in aid of the President: it then
remains for us to carry this intention into effect.”48 The first Congress
pursued this objective by creating the departments of State, War, and
Treasury, as well as the federal judiciary.
When the first Congress created executive agencies, it was con-
cerned that the president would be able to exercise too much author-
ity over them. The first department established by Congress was the
Department of Foreign Affairs, which later became known as the
State Department.49 During the congressional debate over establish-
45. Id. at 1337.
46. Exec. Order No. 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,225 (Feb. 17, 2001), amended by 66 Fed. Reg.
18,717 (Apr. 6, 2001).
47. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, No. 01-0902, 2001 WL 1381197,
at *18, *20 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2001).
48. I CONG. REG. 1, 347 (May 19, 1789), available at http://mep.cla.sc.edu/dynaweb/MEP/
fc/@Generic__BookTextView/4872 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (detailing congres-
sional debate over the establishment of various executive branch departments).
49. After creating the Department of Foreign Affairs in July 1789, Congress rejected the
idea of creating a Home Department that would perform a variety of functions not assigned to
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ing this department, a fundamental question of presidential authority
was raised. While the president could appoint agency heads only with
the advice and consent of the Senate, could he remove them without
Senate approval? This spawned the first constitutional debate in the
new Congress.50
The House of Representatives supported giving the president
authority to remove executive officers without the consent of the
Senate, but it was split over whether this should be stated explicitly in
the legislation creating the department or simply inferred by implica-
tion from the Constitution.51 James Madison argued that because the
Constitution made express provision for advice and consent on ap-
pointments, but was silent on the subject of removals, removals
should fall within Article II’s general grant of power to the presi-
dent.52 William McClay, an opponent of giving the president unfet-
tered powers of removal, claimed that Madison simply was trying to
“pay his Court, to the President.”53
In Federalist No. 77, Alexander Hamilton argued that the con-
sent of the Senate “would be necessary to displace as well as to ap-
point” federal officers.54 He maintained that such a requirement
would prevent an incoming president from disrupting the “steady
administration” of government.55 However, Hamilton later changed
his mind, causing considerable embarrassment to Representative
William Smith of Maryland, who had quoted him during floor debate,
only to be undercut by a note from Hamilton to the effect that Ham-
ilton “was now convinced that the President alone should have the
power of removal at pleasure.”56
In June 1789, the House approved giving the president the
power to remove appointees without the consent of the Senate, im-
other departments, such as granting patents and copyrights and conducting the census.
MARGARET C.S. CHRISTMAN, THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789–1791, at 136 (1989). In Sep-
tember 1789, Congress assigned these duties to the new Department of Foreign Affairs, which
was renamed the Department of State. Id.
50. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 410 n.123 (1996).
51. JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA: 1789–1801, at 30 (1960).
52. CHRISTMAN, supra note 49, at 135.
53. Id.
54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
55. Id.
56. George C. Rogers, ed., The Letters from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge,
June 6, 1789 to April 28, 1794, 69 S.C. HIST. MAG. 1, 8 (1968).
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plying that this was the president’s right under the Constitution.57 The
vote was much closer in the Senate, which, after a fierce debate and
considerable lobbying by members, split evenly when it voted in July.
Vice President Adams broke the tie in favor of allowing the president
unfettered powers of removal.58 Newspapers in his home state of
Massachusetts suggested that Adams had been looking forward to his
own presidency when he broke the tie in favor of greater presidential
power.59
On September 2, 1789, President Washington signed legislation
establishing the second federal executive department, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury.60 Creation of this department had been a par-
ticular subject of controversy because it would control the new na-
tion’s finances. Fearful that it would lose the power of the purse,
Congress considered creating a multimember Board of Treasury with
powers carefully circumscribed by law. Citing the failures of the Con-
tinental Congress to manage financial matters effectively, James
Madison argued forcefully in favor of creating an efficient agency
headed by a single secretary.61 Fearful that the treasury secretary
could be subject to too much presidential control, Congress directed
him to submit his reports directly to Congress, rather than through
the president, and it reserved the right to examine the agency’s finan-
cial documents and to require information from the treasury secre-
tary without presidential intervention.62 Alexander Hamilton, who
had not pursued a seat in Congress in hopes of being appointed to
head the Treasury, became the first treasury secretary.63
The new executive agencies created by the first Congress were a
far cry from the vast bureaucracies that are a fixture of the modern
administrative state. The number of nonmilitary officials working for
the federal government in 1802 was 2597; in 1997 it was 1,872,000.64
The State Department’s Washington office consisted of only four
57. Mr. Benson, The Daily Advertiser, June 22, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
FIRST SESSION, JUNE–SEPT. 1789, 902–04 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992).
58. RAKOVE, supra note 50, at 418 n.15.
59. CHRISTMAN, supra note 49, at 136.
60. Id. at 137.
61. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800, at 258–
61 (1950).
62. MILLER, supra note 51, at 26–27.
63. CHRISTMAN, supra note 49, at 142.
64. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 691 (2000).
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clerks, a messenger, and an office keeper;65 Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson spent most of his time reviewing patent applications.66 The
most powerful agency, the Treasury Department, had thirty clerks
and five officials below the level of secretary; it also was responsible
for supervising nearly a thousand customhouse officials and internal
revenue agents.67 Yet, even while acknowledging the president’s
broad executive powers, Congress entrusted agency heads with cer-
tain decisionmaking responsibilities, and it sought to preserve some
independence for agency heads in their performance of those respon-
sibilities. In light of the small size of agencies at the time, it can be in-
ferred that Congress entrusted agency heads with certain decision-
making responsibilities not because it was so necessary for the
president to delegate executive authority, but because agency heads
were thought to be capable of acquiring expertise relevant to their re-
sponsibilities.
III.  THE EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY:
HISTORICAL PRACTICE
A. Congressional Efforts to Vest Power in Agency Heads
In 1837 the Supreme Court endorsed a broad view of congres-
sional power to impose duties on executive officers that would be ex-
ercised free of the president’s control. In Kendall v. United States68
the Court granted a writ of mandamus requiring the postmaster gen-
eral to pay money that Congress had ordered to be paid by special
statute over the president’s objections. In defense of his order that
the money be withheld, the president invoked the Take Care Clause
as a source of presidential authority to require the postmaster general
not to perform a ministerial duty.69 But the Supreme Court rejected
this view as an “alarming doctrine.”70 The Court distinguished be-
tween “certain political duties” imposed on executive officers “the
discharge of which is under the direction of the President” and duties
65. MILLER, supra note 51, at 33.
66. CHRISTMAN, supra note 49, at 142.
67. MILLER, supra note 51, at 33.
68. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1837).
69. Id. at 539–41.
70. Id. at 610.
PERCIVAL.DOC 02/05/02 10:36 AM
2001] NOT-SO-UNITARY EXECUTIVE 977
imposed on agency heads by Congress, which “are subject to the con-
trol of the law, and not to the direction of the President.”71
Not everyone agreed with early interpretations of presidential
powers that approved of congressional vesting of decisionmaking re-
sponsibilities in agency heads. In 1855, Attorney General Cushing
took the position that no department head could perform an official
act against the will of the president, even in circumstances where
Congress has delegated decisionmaking authority to the agency head.
Take now the converse form of legislation, that common or most or-
dinary style, in which an executive act is, by law, required to be per-
formed by a given Head of Department. I think here the general rule
to be as already stated, that the Head of Department is subject to the
direction of the President. I hold that no Head of Department can
lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President; and
that will is by the Constitution to govern the performance of all such
acts.72
Cushing recognized that a “large proportion” of decisions by
agencies are performed not by “any special direction” of the presi-
dent.73 But he maintained that the president had the authority to di-
rect agency decisions to prevent government from becoming a “par-
liamentary despotism” with a nominal chief executive lacking any
real power.74
The historical practice clearly had been for cabinet secretaries to
consult the president before they made important decisions. As
President Benjamin Harrison wrote, the president “is responsible for
all executive action, and almost everything that is out of the routine
receives some attention from him.”75 President Harrison noted that
“[r]outine matters proceed without the knowledge or interference of
the President; but, if any matter of major importance arises the Sec-
retary presents it for the consideration and advice of the President.”76
In cases of disagreement between the president and agency heads,
President Harrison noted that “there is a yielding of views, now on
one side, now on the other; but it must, of course, follow that when
the President has views that he feels cannot yield, those views must
71. Id.
72. 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469–70 (1855).
73. Id. at 477.
74. Id. at 470.
75. BENJAMIN HARRISON, THIS COUNTRY OF OURS 105 (1897).
76. Id.
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prevail, for the responsibility is his, both in a Constitutional and
popular sense.”77 Harrison argued that a contrary view “would be a
farming-out of his Constitutional powers” to “eight Presidents,” the
agency heads he appointed.78
B. The President’s Removal Power
The first Congress’s decision not to attempt to condition the
president’s removal authority on the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate was only the beginning of the controversy over presidential re-
moval powers. In 1833, when President Andrew Jackson removed the
secretary of treasury for failure to carry out his policy toward the na-
tional bank, the Senate passed a resolution of censure.79 In defense of
his action, President Jackson argued that he was simply exercising his
authority under the Take Care Clause.80 In 1867, Congress passed the
Tenure of Office Act,81 which required Senate consent to the removal
of cabinet officers,82 over President Andrew Johnson’s veto.83 This
triggered the events that led to President Johnson’s impeachment
following his unsuccessful effort to remove Secretary of War Edwin
M. Stanton.84 In 1872 and 1876, Congress adopted legislation requir-
ing Senate consent before the postmaster general and various post-
masters could be removed, though it repealed the Tenure of Office
Act in 1887 following a confrontation with President Grover Cleve-
land.85
The Supreme Court’s most significant pronouncements on the
president’s removal power came in Myers v. United States86 and
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.87 Myers arose when President
Wilson sought to remove a postmaster without the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, as required by the 1876 legislation.88 After Myers
77. Id. at 106.
78. Id. at 70.
79. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESI-
DENT 67 (1985).
80. Id.
81. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 430–32 (1867).
82. Id. § 1.
83. 14 Stat. 432 (noting that the president had vetoed the bill).
84. FISHER, supra note 79, at 69.
85. Id. at 70.
86. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
87. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
88. Myers, 272 U.S. at 106–08.
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sued, the Court upheld his removal by a 6-3 vote.89 In a broad inter-
pretation of presidential power, former President and then–Chief
Justice William Howard Taft, writing for the majority, proclaimed
that the power to remove executive officers is “vest[ed] in the Presi-
dent alone.”90 The Court’s decision that the 1876 law requiring Senate
advice and consent for removals was unconstitutional appeared to be
a sweeping endorsement of presidential power. This perception
changed significantly nine years later when the Court decided Hum-
phrey’s Executor v. United States.
Taft’s sweeping interpretation of presidential power in Myers
was severely undermined when the Court in Humphrey’s Executor
rejected President Franklin Roosevelt’s effort to remove a member
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) before the expiration of his
seven-year term. The commissioner noted that Congress had adopted
a statute permitting removals only for cause and that the president’s
only stated ground for removal was that the FTC member had been
appointed by President Hoover.91 A unanimous Court found that
Congress could require “cause” as a condition for removing an FTC
commissioner.92 While the Court distinguished Myers on the ground
that the FTC was an independent agency exercising quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial duties rather than an arm of the executive,93 the de-
cision confirms the ability of Congress to restrict the president’s re-
moval authority over some executive officers. The Court noted that
when Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act it had in-
tended to create a body “separate and apart from any existing de-
partment of the government—not subject to the orders of the Presi-
dent.”94
The Court’s more contemporary decisions in Buckley v. Valeo95
and Bowsher v. Synar96 encouraged proponents of the “unitary execu-
tive” theory. Those decisions struck down on separation of powers
grounds congressional appointment of members of the Federal Elec-
tion Commission97 and the Graham-Rudman-Hollings Act, which
89. Id. at 176–178, 240.
90. Id. at 135.
91. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–19.
92. Id. at 625–26.
93. Id. at 627–28.
94. Id. at 625.
95. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
96. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
97. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120–36.
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authorized the comptroller general, removable only by Congress, to
review certain acts of the executive branch to enforce a balanced
budget.98 However, the Court’s subsequent decision in Morrison v.
Olson,99 sustaining the appointment and “good cause” removal condi-
tions for an independent counsel under the Ethics in Government
Act,100 decisively rejected the notion that Article II’s Vesting Clause
requires that all executive officers serve at the pleasure of the presi-
dent.
In Morrison, the Court, over Justice Scalia’s dissent,101 concluded
that restrictions on the removal of an independent counsel did not
impermissibly interfere with the president’s ability to exercise execu-
tive power.102 In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
criticized the unitary executive theory as a
rigid demarcation—a demarcation incapable of being altered by law
in the slightest degree, and applicable to tens of thousands of holders
of offices neither known nor foreseen by the framers—[that] de-
pends upon an extrapolation from general constitutional language
which we think is more than the text will bear.103
C. Presidential Efforts to Manage the Executive Branch
1. Presidential Management Before the Rise of the Administra-
tive State. Even before the New Deal and the environmental and con-
sumer protection legislation of the 1970s, many federal statutes gave
the heads of executive agencies responsibility for regulatory deci-
sions. For example, following the creation of the National Park Serv-
ice in 1916, the secretary of the interior was directed by federal law to
“make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem neces-
sary or proper for the use and management of the parks, monuments,
and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National Park Serv-
ice.”104 Other legislation expressly granted broad powers to the presi-
dent to set aside forest reserves and to create national monuments to
98. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734–36.
99. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
100. Id. at 691.
101. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 695–96.
103. Id. at 690 n.29.
104. Act of Aug. 25, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-235, § 3, 39 Stat. 535, 535 (establishing the Na-
tional Park Service).
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preserve objects of “historic or scientific interest.”105 These powers
were used by Presidents Benjamin Harrison and Theodore Roosevelt
to create the National Forest System and the first national monu-
ments through executive orders.106
Most delegations of rulemaking authority had been made by
Congress during wartime—initially the Civil War and later Con-
gress’s decision to give President Woodrow Wilson extraordinary
powers that he could exercise with broad discretion during World
War I.107 Although President Abraham Lincoln was the first to issue
what was formally called an “executive order,” the Congressional
Research Service estimates that during the first seventy-two years of
the republic—a period that spans the presidencies of George Wash-
ington to James Buchanan—presidents issued a total of 143 directives
that now would be considered executive orders.108 As the following
table indicates, the frequency with which executive orders were is-
sued varied dramatically from one presidential administration to an-
other. The dramatic increase in the use of executive orders during the
administration of President Theodore Roosevelt (who issued execu-
tive orders nearly twelve times more frequently than his predecessor)
reflects his aggressive use of presidential power to reshape national
policy. Subsequent presidents made extensive use of executive orders
as they mobilized the executive office to cope with wars and eco-
nomic crises.
105. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, § 2, 34 Stat. 225, 225.
106. Proclamation No. 17, 26 Stat. 1565 (1891) (creating National Forest System); Procla-
mation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906) (creating the nation’s first national monuments).
107. FISHER, supra note 79, at 295–96.
108. JOHN CONTRUBIS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS, at CRS-25, tbl. 1 (Mar. 9, 1999).
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PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS109
PRESIDENT Years in
Office
Number of
Exec. Orders
Exec. Orders
per Year
Grover Cleveland 4.0 71 17.8
William McKinley 4.5 51 11.3
Theodore Roosevelt 7.5 1,006 134.7
William Taft 4.0 698 174.5
Woodrow Wilson 8.0 1,791 223.9
Warren Harding 2.4 484 200.0
Calvin Coolidge 5.6 1,253 224.6
Herbert Hoover 4.0 1,011 252.8
Franklin Roosevelt 12.1 3,728 308.6
Harry Truman 7.8 896 115.2
Dwight Eisenhower 8.0 486 60.8
John Kennedy 2.8 214 75.4
Lyndon Johnson 5.2 324 62.8
Richard Nixon 5.6 346 62.3
Gerald Ford 2.5 169 69.0
Jimmy Carter 4.0 320 80.0
Ronald Reagan 8.0 381 47.6
George H. W. Bush 4.0 166 41.5
William Clinton110 8.0 364 45.5
George W. Bush111 1.0 56 56.0
President Theodore Roosevelt transformed conceptions of
presidential power by articulating a “stewardship” concept of presi-
109. Id. at CRS-25–26.
110. National Archives and Records Administration, Executive Orders Disposition Tables,
Jan. 9, 1939–Jan. 16, 2002, at http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/eo.html (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
111. Id.
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dential administration112 and by making aggressive use of executive
orders as a means of establishing federal policy. In addition to issuing
executive orders, Roosevelt used the “bully pulpit” of the presidency
in a wide variety of ways to influence policy. He lobbied Congress for
new laws and for appropriations to promote new programs, ap-
pointed presidential commissions, convened conferences, required
his personal approval for every transfer of federal lands to private in-
terests, and cajoled executive officials to enforce existing laws.113
Roosevelt also sought to take control over communications be-
tween executive officials and Congress. In January 1902, he issued an
executive order prohibiting executive officers from lobbying Con-
gress except through the heads of their agencies.114 President William
Howard Taft expanded Roosevelt’s efforts to gain control over ex-
ecutive administration by broadening clearance requirements for ex-
ecutive communications to Congress and by establishing a Commis-
sion on Economy and Efficiency, which recommended the creation of
a unified federal budget.115 When Taft announced that his administra-
tion would prepare such a budget, Congress responded angrily to
what it perceived as an encroachment on its legislative prerogatives
and adopted legislation prohibiting executive officials from preparing
budget documents that were not specifically required by law.116
In 1919, Congress passed legislation giving the president author-
ity to prepare a budget, but President Wilson vetoed the bill because
it sought to restrict executive powers by making the newly estab-
lished comptroller general an officer of Congress not removable by
the president.117 In 1921, Congress enacted the Budget and Account-
ing Act, which created a Bureau of the Budget in the Department of
the Treasury.118 In December 1921, the first director of the Bureau of
the Budget, Charles M. Dawes, sought to expand its powers to re-
quire the heads of executive agencies to submit all legislative propos-
112. THE WRITINGS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 139 (William H. Harbaugh ed., 1967)
(providing accounts of President Theodore Roosevelt’s conservation policies for the nation’s
natural resources).
113. Id. at 147.
114. KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 115 (2001) (quoting Executive Order 163 from January 31, 1902).
115. STEVEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 187 (1982).
116. MAYER, supra note 114, at 117.
117. FISHER, supra note 79, at 74.
118. MAYER, supra note 114, at 113.
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als with financial consequences to the Bureau for clearance.119 This
provoked vigorous opposition from agency heads, which resulted in
Dawes backing off from enforcement of the requirement contained in
Budget Circular No. 49, though it later was revived during the Coo-
lidge administration and repeatedly expanded by President Franklin
Roosevelt.120
During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson had made ag-
gressive use of executive orders to increase the ability of the White
House to manage the growing federal bureaucracy. Critics of presi-
dential power complained that the executive branch was exercising
too much legislative power in issuing rules, a practice then referred to
as “ordinance making.” An article in the Michigan Law Review in
1920 complained: “Few people are aware of the great extent to which
public administration in the United States national government is
controlled by means of administrative regulations or orders, in the
nature of subordinate legislation.”121 Even aside from “systematized
and codified regulations, there is perhaps an even more extensive
body of more specialized rules, orders, and instructions issued by the
various departments, bureaus, commissions, and local agents, knowl-
edge of which is often limited to the persons who have to apply them
and to those whom they affect.”122
Writing in 1925, James Hart, a professor of political science,
raised concerns about the delegation of legislative authority to execu-
tive agencies. While noting that the breadth of rulemaking authority
exercised by executive agencies seemingly contradicted the Constitu-
tion’s directive in Article I that “all legislative powers” be vested in
Congress, he observed that the Supreme Court had studiously
avoided confronting this conflict by referring to agency rulemaking as
the exercise of “administrative” rather than “legislative” powers.123
This reflected in large part the practical reasons for rulemaking by
executive agencies.124 “In thus refusing to call a spade a spade the
Court has sought to allow needed flexibility in governmental ar-
119. Treasury Dep’t Bureau of the Budget, Circular No. 49: Transmission to Congress of Esti-
mates or Reports Involving Appropriations, Dec. 19, 1921, § 3, reprinted in CHARLES G. DAWES,
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 162 (1923).
120. MAYER, supra note 114, at 119–20.
121. John A. Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, 18 MICH. L. REV. 181, 181 (1920).
122. Id. at 183.
123. HART, supra note 14, at 17–18.
124. Id. at 18.
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rangements without admitting that Congress can devolve its constitu-
tional powers upon the Executive.”125
Presidential power over the bureaucracy continued to expand
with the enactment of the Reorganization Act of 1939, which gave
the president power to reorganize the executive branch.126 The Act
was a product of the recommendations of President Franklin Roose-
velt’s Brownlow Commission, which also spawned the creation of the
Executive Office of the President.127 To increase the power of the Bu-
reau of the Budget and to make it more accountable to the president,
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8248, which moved the Bureau
into the Executive Office of the President.128 During World War II,
the office expanded dramatically in size and power.
2. Presidential Management During the Nixon, Ford, and Carter
Administrations: Increasing Activism. Beginning in the late 1960s,
Congress established a series of regulatory programs to protect pub-
lic health and safety, the environment, and consumer interests.129
These programs substantially increased the regulatory power of ex-
ecutive agencies, and they spawned the development of new mecha-
nisms for presidential oversight of rulemaking by executive agen-
cies.130 One of the most important presidential oversight mechanisms
has been the creation of regulatory review processes, which were first
instituted in the Nixon administration and continued in somewhat al-
tered form by Presidents Ford and Carter.
President Nixon recognized the importance of asserting presi-
dential influence over the actions of executive agencies that were ac-
quiring more power with the new regulatory legislation. Shortly after
taking office, he appointed the Ash Council on Executive Reorgani-
zation to make recommendations for reorganizing the executive
125. Id.
126. Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 561 (1939).
127. PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY: COMPREHENSIVE
REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905–1996, at 103 (2d ed. 1998).
128. Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. 576, 576 (1938–1943) (“[e]stablishing the divisions of
the Executive Office of the President and defining their functions and duties”).
129. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 104–09 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the development of major federal environmental
legislation starting in the 1960s).
130. For a history of presidential oversight of rulemaking covering the period from 1970
through 1990, see generally Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office
Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 128–55
(Autumn 1991).
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branch.131 Based on the Ash Council’s recommendations, in July 1970
President Nixon issued Executive Order 11,541, which created the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and gave it the authority
that previously had been exercised by the Bureau of the Budget.132
The Nixon administration also substantially increased the size of the
White House staff and created the Domestic Council, which assumed
responsibility for coordinating the actions of executive agencies.133
To allay the corporate community’s fears of the consequences of
the new federal regulatory legislation, President Nixon on April 9,
1970, issued an executive order creating the National Industrial Pol-
lution Control Council (NIPCC).134 NIPCC consisted of sixty-three
top corporate executives appointed by Commerce Secretary Maurice
Stans who met in secret with federal officials to air complaints about
impending regulatory actions.135
As part of the reorganization of the executive branch under-
taken in response to the recommendations of the Ash Council, Presi-
dent Nixon created the EPA by executive order.136 The EPA went
into operation on December 2, 1970. Nixon also proposed creating
four new superagencies to replace existing cabinet offices.137 How-
ever, he did not include the EPA in this proposal because of the im-
portance of keeping the EPA’s regulatory functions independent
from the programs of the other cabinet offices.138 To provide a
mechanism for exerting presidential influence on environmental and
workplace safety regulations, President Nixon established the “Qual-
ity of Life” review program. This program required the EPA and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to submit
proposals for significant environmental and occupational safety
131. MAYER, supra note 114, at 123.
132. Exec. Order No. 11,541, 3 C.F.R. 939, 939 (1966–1970), reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 501
(1994) (“[p]rescribing the duties of the Office of Management and Budget and the Domestic
Council in the Executive Office of the President”).
133. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2276 (2001).
134. Exec. Order No. 11,523, 3 C.F.R. 915, 915 (1966–1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994) (“[e]stablishing the National Industrial Pollution Control Council”).
135. The stated purpose of the NIPCC was to “allow businessmen to communicate regu-
larly with the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and other governmental offi-
cials and private organizations” with respect to regulatory initiatives. Percival, supra note 130,
at 130.
136. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966–1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing the Environmental Protection Agency).
137. Percival, supra note 130, at 133.
138. Id.
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regulations to OMB so that they could be circulated to other agencies
for review and comment before they were issued.139 This review proc-
ess produced several heated battles among the EPA, the Department
of Commerce, and OMB over regulations being developed by the en-
vironmental agency.
President Ford continued the Quality of Life review program,
though his administration was less involved in efforts to influence
regulatory decisions than the Nixon administration had been. In No-
vember 1974, President Ford issued Executive Order 11,821, which
required agencies to prepare inflation impact statements before
promulgating major regulations.140 The newly created Council on
Wage and Price Stability was given responsibility for reviewing pro-
posed rules for their inflationary impact, a process that took place on
the rulemaking record during the normal public comment period for
proposed regulations.141 Unlike the Nixon administration’s regulatory
review program, which had focused exclusively on environmental
regulations, the Ford administration’s program concentrated primar-
ily on economic regulations such as those issued by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board.142
President Carter’s regulatory review program was established by
Executive Order 12,044, issued on March 23, 1978.143 It required ex-
ecutive agencies to prepare a “regulatory analysis” for all proposed
rules likely to have an annual economic impact of $100 million or
more.144 These analyses, which were to include an assessment of the
economic consequences of the proposed regulation and an evaluation
of alternatives to it, were reviewed by an interagency committee
called the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG).145 RARG
was composed of representatives from seventeen agencies and
chaired by the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.146
139. Id. at 133–34.
140. Exec. Order No. 11,821 § 1, 3 C.F.R. 926, 926 (1971–1975), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. §
1904 (1994) (ordering the preparation of “Inflation Impact Statements”).
141. Percival, supra note 130, at 139–40.
142. Id. at 140.
143. Exec. Order No. 12,044 pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 152, 152 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1994) (directing the agencies of the executive branch “to adopt procedures to improve existing
and future regulations”).
144. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 154.
145. Christopher C. DeMuth, Constraining Regulatory Costs—Part One: The White House
Review Programs, REG.: AEI J. ON GOV’T & SOC’Y, Jan.–Feb. 1980, at 16.
146. ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION
69 n.18 (1983).
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During the waning days of the Carter administration in 1980,
Congress enacted the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork
Reduction Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to
perform detailed analyses of alternatives to regulations likely to have
a disproportionate impact on small businesses.147 This legislation had
little significance for agencies until Congress made compliance with
its provisions subject to judicial review by adopting the Small Busi-
ness Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act in 1996.148 The Paperwork
Reduction Act broadened OMB’s authority to prevent agencies from
imposing unnecessary paperwork burdens on the public by requiring
OMB clearance for all agency proposals to collect information.149 It
also created OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA),150 the OMB office now responsible for conducting regula-
tory reviews for the Executive Office of the President.
The executive orders creating the regulatory review programs
established by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and George
H. W. Bush were careful not to assert presidential authority to dic-
tate agency decisions. As noted above, the Nixon, Ford, and Carter
programs consisted largely of interagency review procedures that did
not purport to allow the Executive Office of the President to block or
to modify agency regulatory actions.151
During the Nixon administration, OMB vigorously opposed cer-
tain regulatory initiatives, but it conceded that the agencies “would
have final say on whether to adopt a specific regulation.”152 In 1972,
there were allegations that OMB was making regulatory decisions for
the EPA. Denying these charges, EPA Administrator William Ruck-
elshaus stated that “if they were, I would be breaking the law, and I
would not function as Administrator of this Agency if I let them do
so.”153 However, OMB’s influence on the EPA was so substantial that
147. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (1994)).
148. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
§ 203, 110 Stat. 857, 857–58.
149. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (current version
at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (1994)).
150. Id. § 3503, 94 Stat. 2814–15.
151. See supra notes 131–50 and accompanying text.
152. Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Policymaking,
Faces Little External Review, 7 BNA ENV’T REP., May–Oct. 1976, at 696–97.
153. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970—Part I: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the S. Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 325 (1972)
(statement of William Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator).
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both Ruckelshaus and his successor Russell Train asked President
Nixon for written assurances that they would retain ultimate author-
ity for EPA policy decisions as conditions for remaining in office.154
Russell Train explained in 1976 that he insisted on having the final
say over regulatory decisions by the EPA to protect the agency’s
“regulatory integrity” in the eyes of the public, Congress, and other
federal agencies.155 Yet it is clear that intense White House pressure
affected some of his decisions, as when he ultimately agreed to delay
for a year the effective date of regulations limiting the lead content of
gasoline.156 Still the EPA retained a considerable degree of independ-
ence under Train, who openly disagreed with the White House when
President Ford twice vetoed legislation regulating strip mining.157
President Carter’s few attempts to influence regulatory decisions
sparked controversy. Carter sought unsuccessfully to convince the
secretary of labor to weaken OSHA’s regulations to protect workers
from exposure to cotton dust, regulations that later were upheld by
the Supreme Court.158 Prior to the EPA’s issuance of new source per-
formance standards for coal-fired power plants, Carter called EPA
Administrator Douglas Costle to the White House to discuss the
regulations.159 This meeting provoked a legal challenge to the regula-
tions by environmental groups that argued that the EPA’s failure to
document the meeting in the rulemaking record violated the Clean
Air Act and denied them procedural due process. These arguments
were rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in
Sierra Club v. Costle.
3. Centralized Regulatory Review During the Reagan and
George H. W. Bush Administrations. Although the Nixon, Ford, and
154. These events are described in a book by Train’s deputy. JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING
UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 119
(1976) (reporting that President Nixon verbally agreed that the EPA administrator would re-
tain ultimate authority for agency policy decisions, but that the agency subsequently “bar-
gained in vain with OMB to spell out the change in writing”).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 117–42.
157. JOHN OSBORNE, WHITE HOUSE WATCH: THE FORD YEARS xvi (1977) (analyzing the
policies of the Ford administration).
158. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (stating that,
through the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, Congress “chose to place pre-eminent
value on assuring employees a safe and healthful working environment, limited only by the fea-
sibility of achieving such an environment”).
159. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Carter regulatory review programs were designed primarily to facili-
tate interagency dialogue, the Reagan administration’s regulatory re-
view program was designed primarily to reduce the burden of regula-
tion by making it substantially more difficult for agencies to issue
rules. On the first working day of his administration, President
Reagan announced the formation of a Vice-Presidential Task Force
on Regulatory Relief chaired by then–Vice President George H. W.
Bush.160 The Task Force was charged with reducing regulatory bur-
dens on industry.161 It suspended nearly 200 pending regulations and
ultimately developed a “hit list” of 119 existing regulations (primarily
environmental, health, and safety regulations) that it directed agen-
cies to reconsider.162
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan launched his admini-
stration’s program for review of new regulatory proposals by issuing
Executive Order 12,291.163 This executive order mandated that agen-
cies submit all proposed and final regulations to OMB’s OIRA for
review and that they refrain from publishing them in the Federal
Register until OIRA’s approval had been obtained.164 Rules likely to
have an economic impact of $100 million annually were to be accom-
panied by cost-benefit analyses called “regulatory impact analyses.”165
The Reagan regulatory review program quickly became the focus of
considerable controversy.166
The Reagan program represented a significant departure from
previous presidential efforts to influence rulemaking decisions by ex-
ecutive agencies in several respects. First, unlike previous programs
that authorized selective review of particularly significant regula-
160. Percival, supra note 130, at 148.
161. Id.
162. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN
REGULATORY AGENCIES 10 (1987).
163. Exec. Order No. 12,291 pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1982) (seeking “to reduce the bur-
dens of existing and future regulations . . . and insure well-reasoned regulations”).
164. Id. § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 128–30.
165. Id. §§ 1(b)(1), (3)(c), 3 C.F.R. at 127, 128–29.
166. See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1986) (explaining and responding to criti-
cisms of President Reagan’s regulatory review program); Alan B. Morrison, The Wrong Way to
Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (1986) (arguing that “whatever theoretical
legitimacy there may be for OMB involvement in the rulemaking process, its dominance under
the present system is unwarranted”); Erik Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Manage-
ment & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive
Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 1 (1984) (discussing OMB’s authority to review
EPA rules under Executive Order 12,291).
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tions, the Reagan program required that all proposed and all final
regulations be submitted to OIRA for approval prior to publication.
The Reagan program effectively enabled OIRA to block publication
of regulations for an indefinite period of time.
Another significant feature of the Reagan program was that it
established substantive criteria for agencies to use in setting regula-
tory standards. Agencies were instructed that they should not issue
regulations unless their benefits exceed their costs, that they should
choose regulatory alternatives that involve “the least net cost to soci-
ety,” and that regulatory priorities should be set to maximize “aggre-
gate net benefits to society.”167 This represented a substantial depar-
ture from the Carter administration’s regulatory review program,
which had encouraged agencies to develop cost-effective regulations
while emphasizing that cost-benefit tests need not be satisfied.168
Finally, unlike the Regulatory Analysis Review Group review
process, which took place on the public record during the comment
period on proposed regulations, the Reagan program sought to shield
regulatory reviews from public view. Although OIRA eventually
adopted disclosure policies that allowed written exchanges between it
and the agencies, to be released following the completion of review,
OIRA’s views typically were not incorporated into the public record,
even in rulemakings under the Clean Air Act where Congress explic-
itly had required it.169
Concerned that regulatory review was taking place too late in
the process to effect major changes in agency regulatory plans, the
Reagan administration issued Executive Order 12,498 on January 4,
1985.170 This executive order established a regulatory planning proc-
ess that required agencies to submit annually to OIRA a draft regula-
tory program describing all significant regulatory actions they
planned to undertake during the next year.171 Regulatory plans that
were found to be consistent with the administration’s policies and
priorities were included in an annual publication called The Regula-
tory Program of the United States Government.172
167. Exec. Order 12,291 § 2(d)–(e), 3 C.F.R. at 128.
168. George C. Eads, White House Oversight of Executive Branch Regulation, in SOCIAL
REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 180–81 (Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan eds.,
1982).
169. Percival, supra note 130, at 152.
170. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).
171. Id. § 2, 3 C.F.R. at 324.
172. E.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
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The Reagan administration’s regulatory review program raised
far more serious concerns about displacement of agency decision-
making authority because it directed agencies not to issue proposed
or final regulations until OMB approved them. To avoid legal prob-
lems, the executive order that established the Reagan program ex-
pressly stated that nothing in the order “shall be construed as dis-
placing the agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.”173 In its
opinion supporting the legality of the Reagan program, the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel emphasized that OMB’s
role in regulatory review was to be “advisory and consultative” only
and that it did not include the authority to reject an agency’s ultimate
judgment on matters delegated to the agency by law.174
Although there is substantial evidence that OMB sought to
abuse its regulatory review power during the Reagan administration
to dictate decisions entrusted by law to agencies,175 the administration
never expressly asserted the authority to do so. A court hearing a
challenge to an OSHA regulation found it unnecessary to decide if
OMB had acted unlawfully because the decision supposedly dictated
by OMB was found not to have sufficient support in the rulemaking
record. In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson,176 OSHA
had been ordered by OMB to delete a short-term exposure limit from
regulations controlling worker exposure to ethylene oxide.177 The
court noted that “OMB’s participation in the [ethylene oxide] rule-
making presents difficult constitutional questions concerning the ex-
ecutive’s proper rule in administrative proceedings and the appropri-
ate scope of delegated power from Congress to certain executive
agencies.”178 However, the court found it unnecessary to decide the
STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1, 1990–MARCH 31, 1991 (1990).
173. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982).
174. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (Feb. 13, 1981), re-
printed in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 486 (1981) (providing a pro-
posed executive order entitled “Federal Regulation”).
175. See Olson, supra note 166, at 6; EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses
(Part 3): Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 7–8 (1983) (testimony of John Daniel, former EPA Chief of
Staff); id. at 234 (testimony of Anne McGill Burford, former EPA Administrator) (describing
“some serious abuses” by OMB).
176. 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
177. Id. at 1483.
178. Id. at 1507.
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legality of OMB’s actions because it found the decision to delete the
short-term exposure limit was unsupported by the record.179
OMB was found by a court to have acted illegally when it
blocked the EPA from issuing a regulation after a statutory deadline
for promulgating it had expired. In Environmental Defense Fund v.
Thomas,180 a federal district court declared that “OMB has no
authority to use its regulatory review under EO 12291 to delay prom-
ulgation of EPA regulations . . . beyond the date of a statutory dead-
line.”181 The court recognized that the use of regulatory review
to create delays and to impose substantive changes raises some con-
stitutional concerns. Congress enacts environmental legislation after
years of study and deliberation, and then delegates to the expert
judgment of the EPA Administrator the authority to issue regula-
tions carrying out the aims of the law. Under EO 12291, if used im-
properly, OMB could withhold approval until the acceptance of cer-
tain content in the promulgation of any new EPA regulation,
thereby encroaching upon the independence and expertise of EPA.
Further, unsuccessful executive lobbying on Capitol Hill can still be
pursued administratively by delaying the enactment of regulations
beyond the date of a statutory deadline.182
The administration of President George H. W. Bush continued
the regulatory review program established during the Reagan ad-
ministration. In 1989, it announced the creation of the Council on
Competitiveness, chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle.183 The
Competitiveness Council was charged with resolving disputes over
regulatory review between OIRA and executive agencies.184 Its mem-
bership was tilted heavily toward the economic agencies. Its six per-
manent members included the director of OMB, the secretary of
commerce, the secretary of the treasury, the chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisers, the attorney general, and the White House
chief of staff.185 In its most publicized action, the Council vetoed EPA
Administrator William Reilly’s attempt to include a twenty-five per-
179. Id.; cf. Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA, 866 F.2d 717, 729 n.22 (5th Cir. 1989)
(stating that the “final rule must stand or fall on the basis of the record before the agency, not
on the basis of some ‘secret record’ of OMB’s”).
180. 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
181. Id. at 571.
182. Id. at 570.
183. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 172, at 5.
184. Id.
185. Percival, supra note 130, at 155.
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cent recycling requirement in a new source–performance standard for
municipal incinerators.186
In December 1990, Reilly appealed to the Council to challenge
OMB’s rejection of a waste stream recycling requirement and a ban
on incineration of lead acid batteries in a new source–performance
standard for municipal incinerators.187After the Council ruled in favor
of OMB, Reilly withdrew the requirements from the regulations.188
When challenged in court, the deletion of the ban on incineration of
lead acid batteries was remanded to the EPA for reconsideration be-
cause of the agency’s failure to explain adequately its reasons for the
deletion.189 However, the court upheld the decisions not to include the
recycling requirement, finding that it had adequate support in the re-
cord.190 The court noted that the EPA’s change of position “in light of
the [Competitiveness] Council’s advice . . . does not mean that EPA
failed to exercise its own expertise in promulgating the final rules.”191
This decision does not suggest that OMB or the Competitiveness
Council had the authority to dictate the EPA’s decision, particularly
because it rests on the notion that the EPA continued to exercise its
own expertise in accepting their advice. But the decision confirms
that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the judiciary to
police displacement if the agency accepts it.
President George H. W. Bush became directly involved in a few
regulatory decisions, including a dispute over Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) regulations to implement the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990. David Kessler, the commissioner of the
FDA, has described how OMB (with the support of the Department
of Agriculture) tried to require the FDA to modify its proposed food
labeling regulations to mollify the meat industry, which wanted to
obscure information about the fat content of foods.192 At a White
House meeting, Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan
186. Id.
187. This appeal is described in New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1148–50 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
188. Michael Weisskopf, EPA Proposal on Recycling Is Trashed; White House Panel Op-
poses Agency Plan, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1990, at A17 (stating that the Council “in its first
major regulatory decision, urged Reilly to drop a proposal that the administration had touted
just a year ago as a remedy to the nation’s burgeoning solid waste problem”).
189. Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1153.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1152.
192. KESSLER, supra note 1, at 56–57 (discussing his experience as the commissioner of the
FDA).
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showed the president a McDonald’s restaurant tray liner that con-
tained nutritional information consistent with the FDA’s approach.193
Sullivan argued that the FDA could not adopt the meat industry’s
proposal because it was not supported by the rulemaking record.194
This reportedly surprised President Bush, who stated:
“I’m a little puzzled. I’m being told that I can’t just make a decision
and have it promptly executed, that the Department can’t just salute
smartly and go execute whatever decision I make. Why is that?”195
Kessler reports that he and Sullivan were prepared to resign if
the White House ordered the FDA to issue the rules sought by the
meat industry.196 Instead, to their surprise, the president directed that
the regulations preferred by the FDA be promulgated, though he did
not accept the FDA’s proposal to apply them to restaurants.197 This
appears to be an example of the president’s dictating a decision to an
agency head. However, because he chose the decision generally fa-
vored by the agency, the agency head accepted the decision and did
not resign in protest.
4. Presidential Management During the Clinton and George W.
Bush Administrations. On September 30, 1993, President Clinton’s
regulatory review program was established by the issuance of Execu-
tive Order 12,866.198 The Clinton program returned to a far more se-
lective approach to regulatory review. Only “significant regulatory
actions” (defined to include those that have more than a $100 million
annual impact or other significant adverse effects) were subjected to
review by OIRA.199 It also established a firm ninety-day deadline for
completion of OIRA review, and it specified that the vice president
should resolve disputes between agencies and OIRA.200
The Clinton administration’s regulatory review program was far
less controversial than those of the preceding administrations in part
because it was much more selective and more transparent. However,
President Clinton greatly expanded the issuance of formal presiden-
193. Id. at 69.
194. Id. at 68.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 67–69.
197. Id. at 70–71.
198. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
199. Id. § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
200. Id. §§ 5(a), 7, 3 C.F.R. at 644, 648.
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tial directives to executive agencies. Presidents Reagan and George
H. W. Bush had issued only nine and four presidential directives, re-
spectively, to executive agencies—three of these instructed agencies
to delay or halt the issuance of regulations.201 By contrast, President
Clinton issued 107 presidential directives, including many directing
agencies to take regulatory action to deal with particular problems.202
Although President Clinton’s regulatory review program was
less controversial than those employed by the two previous admini-
strations, in some respects it asserted greater presidential authority
over agencies. Executive Order 12,866, which established the pro-
gram, purported to subject independent agencies to OMB’s regula-
tory planning process for the first time, though like its predecessors it
did not require independent agencies to submit individual rules to
OMB for review.203 Even more significantly, section 7 of the executive
order provided that
[t]o the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between
or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that can-
not be resolved by the Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by
the President, or by the Vice President acting at the request of the
President, with the relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other
interested governmental officials).204
After considering recommendations developed within sixty days
by the vice president, this “conflict resolution” process is to culmi-
nate in notification to the agency and OMB “of the President’s deci-
sion with respect to the matter.”205
This procedure for resolving disputes arising during the regula-
tory review process is similar to the way the George H. W. Bush
White House handled the dispute over the nutrition labeling regula-
tions, though the Clinton executive order has strict requirements for
disclosure of any outside lobbying: communications during the review
period with any person not employed by the federal government have
to be in writing and included in the public rulemaking docket.206
201. Kagan, supra note 133, at 2294.
202. Id. at 2294–95.
203. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c), 3 C.F.R. at 642–43.
204. Id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648.
205. Id.
206. Id. Kessler reports that during the nutrition labeling dispute, Craig Fuller, “who had
been President Bush’s chief of staff when Bush was vice president” was lobbying the White
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Kessler reports that President Bush resolved the nutrition labeling
dispute by deciding not only what calorie count the regulations
should recommend, but also what the specific design format for a na-
tionwide, standardized nutrition label for all non-meat and processed
meat products should be.207
Because the Clinton administration’s regulatory review program
generally was so well received, the controversy over presidential
oversight of rulemaking died down.208 In large part this was because
President Clinton pursued a far more balanced approach to regula-
tory policy. Rather than focusing exclusively on reducing regulatory
burdens to industry, the Clinton administration used presidential di-
rectives to spur agencies to take actions to improve public health,
safety, and environmental protections. Describing this pattern as
“presidential administration,” Professor Elena Kagan argues that it
demonstrates that enhanced presidential control over administration
can serve pro-regulatory objectives.209 Kagan, who served in the
Clinton White House, argues that President Clinton acted to assert
personal ownership over executive agencies’ regulatory activity by is-
suing directives to agencies to influence their regulatory priorities
and by visibly taking credit for regulatory initiatives that supported
his political agenda.210 As a result of this activity, Kagan maintains
that the president has, at least for now, achieved primacy in directing
and influencing the outcome of the regulatory process.211
Kagan notes, however, that President Clinton’s assertion of “di-
rective authority” over the actions of executive agencies raises even
more serious constitutional questions than the Reagan administra-
tion’s regulatory review program.212 These include the question ad-
dressed in Part IV of this Essay: whether the president has the
authority to dictate decisions entrusted by law to agency heads.
House as a lobbyist for Kraft, which opposed labeling requirements that would not allow their
cheeses to be identified as “light” in fat content. KESSLER, supra note 1, at 58.
207. Id. at 70–71.
208. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 28–29 (3d
ed. 1998) (stating that the issues surrounding presidential review have “gradually evolved into
a fairly broad agreement that it is not only legal, but that if properly administered, it is essential
to effective executive branch management”).
209. Kagan, supra note 133, at 2282.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2319.
212. Id.
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The Clinton administration’s assertion of presidential authority
to resolve disputes between agencies is somewhat less troubling from
a constitutional perspective than the notion of its resolving disputes
between OMB and an agency. In circumstances where there is a dis-
pute between two cabinet agencies that are pursuing incompatible
approaches to a regulatory issue (as in the nutrition labeling example
in which the Department of Health and Human Services and the Ag-
riculture Department were fundamentally at odds), the case for hav-
ing the president or vice president resolve the dispute is considerably
stronger because the White House is uniquely situated to resolve
conflicts between agencies. But if the dispute is between OMB and
an agency head, a directive from the White House instructing the
agency head how the dispute is to be resolved looks suspiciously like
displacement of decisionmaking authority entrusted to agency heads
by law.
In her excellent defense of the Clinton administration’s brand of
presidential administration, Professor Kagan distinguishes the Steel
Seizure case on the ground that Congress had not passed any law
authorizing the president or the secretary of commerce to seize the
steel mills. She maintains that because considerable regulatory legis-
lation authorized the very actions President Clinton directed agency
heads to undertake, the Steel Seizure Case does not undermine the
legality of Clinton’s actions.213 Professor Kagan suggests that if Con-
gress had authorized the secretary of commerce to seize the steel
mills, President’s Truman’s action would have been legal even though
Congress had entrusted the decision to the secretary of commerce
and not to the president.214
Kagan’s view is not founded on the unitary executive theory,
which, as demonstrated above, is inconsistent not only with the his-
torical understanding of Article II as reflected in the first Congress’s
establishment of federal agencies, but also with the Court’s decision
upholding the constitutionality of legislative restrictions on the presi-
dent’s removal power.215 But Kagan argues that where Congress has
not acted expressly to restrict the president’s ability to direct an ad-
ministrative agency to act, courts should interpret federal statutes to
permit the president to do so.216 Kagan maintains that such an inter-
213. Id. at 2321.
214. Id. at 2321–22.
215. See supra notes 48–67, 79–103 and accompanying text.
216. Kagan, supra note 133, at 2327–28.
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pretive principle (“presuming an undifferentiated presidential control
of executive agency officials”) may be a more accurate interpretation
of Congress’s true intent.217
Kagan’s argument may find a receptive audience among some
members of the Supreme Court who currently appear to favor clear
statement requirements when interpreting statutes that impinge on
interests they seek to protect.218 But given the assumption that pre-
vailed when the current regulatory statutes were enacted—that the
president did not have the authority to dictate regulatory decisions
entrusted to agencies by law—it is hard to make a case that Congress
needed to enact legislation that specifically prohibited displacement
for the president to be foreclosed from displacing agencies’ decisions.
As noted above, every regulatory review program since the rise of
the administrative state has been founded on the notion that the
president did not have the authority to displace agency decision-
making.219 Thus, it is hardly surprising that while some legislation
delegates decisions to the president, other legislation delegates deci-
sions to agency heads without including specific directives prohibiting
the president from dictating the decisions. The fact that the president
may in turn redelegate decisions entrusted to him by law also does
not imply that he has the authority to dictate decisions instead en-
trusted by law to other executive officials.
Presidential review of rulemaking by executive agencies is likely
to become more contentious under the George W. Bush administra-
tion, which is far more skeptical of regulation than the Clinton ad-
ministration was. On the day that the Bush administration took of-
fice, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Jr., issued a
memorandum to the heads of all executive department agencies di-
recting them not to send any proposed or final regulations to the
Federal Register without the approval of a Bush appointee and to
withdraw all regulations that had been sent to the Federal Register
which had not yet been published, except for rules dealing with
emergency situations.220
217. Id. at 2328.
218. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170–73
(2001) (interpreting narrowly the reach of the Clean Water Act in the absence of clearer evi-
dence that Congress intended to impinge on federalism values).
219. See supra notes 151–59, 173–74 and accompanying text.
220. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., White House Chief of Staff, to the Heads
and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 20, 2001), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010123-4.html.
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Although the Bush administration ultimately decided not to re-
consider several regulations promulgated toward the end of the
Clinton administration, its initial decision to reconsider tighter limits
on arsenic in drinking water sparked considerable criticism.221 This
criticism was so intense that the EPA announced in October 2001
that it had decided to implement the Clinton administration rule low-
ering the maximum contaminant level for arsenic in drinking water
from fifty to ten parts per billion.222
The most prominent regulation rescinded by the Bush admini-
stration was a regulation promulgated by OSHA. With the support of
the Bush administration, Congress used the provisions of the Con-
gressional Review Act (CRA)223 for the first time in March 2001 to
veto OSHA’s ergonomics standard, which had been under develop-
ment by the agency for nearly a decade.224 The CRA requires agen-
cies to send all regulations to Congress for review sixty days before
221. The decision to reconsider the arsenic rule provoked considerable public outrage.
Public opinion polls showed that it was intensely unpopular. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic
of Arsenic (Aug. 2001) at http://www.Aei-brookings.org/publications/working/working_01_10.
pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Editorial writers harshly denounced it. See Robert K.
Musil, Arsenic on Tap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at A18. The Democratic party quickly
filmed a television commercial attacking the decision by having a small child ask her mother
for more arsenic. See Michael Kelly, Bush’s Summer Vacation Is Almost Over, TownHall.com
Columnists, Aug. 22, 2001, at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/michaelkelly/mk20010822.
html (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The former EPA official responsible for the rule
during the Clinton administration denounced the decision as an “action [that] will jeopardize
the health of millions of Americans” and that “compromises literally a decade’s worth of work
on behalf of developing a public health standard.” Douglas Jehl, EPA to Abandon New Arsenic
Limits for Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at A1; see also Jeanne Cummings & John
Harwood, Arsenic Issue May Poison Bush’s “Compassionate Conservatism,” WALL ST. J., Apr.
20, 2001, at A16 (discussing environmentalists’ response to the new administration’s reconsid-
eration of the arsenic regulations and examining President George W. Bush’s conservative po-
litical background); Peter Waldman, Dangerous Waters: All Agree Arsenic Kills; The Question
Is How Much It Takes to Do So, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2001, at A1 (describing scientific evi-
dence supporting the regulation of arsenic levels in drinking water).
222. Office of Water, United States Environmental Protection Agency, EPA to Implement
10 ppb Standard for Arsenic in Drinking Water, at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/ars-oct-
factsheet.html (Oct. 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
223. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2000).
224. On March 1, 2001, congressional Republicans introduced a resolution of disapproval
that was approved by the Senate on March 6, 2001, by a vote of 56-44. On March 7, the House
of Representatives adopted the joint resolution by a vote of 223-206. OSHA had expected that
its ergonomics rules would prevent 500,000 worker injuries per year from carpal tunnel syn-
drome, back strains, and other ailments. 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262 (Nov. 14, 2000). OSHA acknowl-
edged that the rule would be expensive for businesses, estimating that it ultimately could cost
$4.5 billion to implement, but it projected that it would save $9 billion per year by reducing
worker injuries. Id.
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they take effect and it creates a special fast-track procedure to enable
Congress to enact joint resolutions disapproving regulations.225 If
Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, the regulation shall
not take effect or continue in effect, and the agency that issued the
measure is prohibited from issuing any new rule that is “substantially
the same as” the disapproved rule unless specifically authorized by
subsequent legislation.226
Using the fast-track procedures of the CRA, the joint resolution
disapproving OSHA’s regulation was adopted without any hearings
or committee action, with no opportunity for amendments, and with
floor debate limited to ten hours in the Senate and one hour in the
House.227 President Bush endorsed the disapproval effort228 and signed
the joint resolution repealing the rule. Many of those who voted to
repeal the rule stated that they were not opposed to having an ergo-
nomics standard, but that they objected to the particular standard
that OSHA adopted.229 Labor Secretary Elaine Chao announced that
the department would consider a new rule to protect workers from
repetitive-motion injuries.230 Others, however, believe that the CRA
precludes OSHA from issuing a new ergonomics rule without new
legislation specifically authorizing it to do so.231
President Bush’s support for using the CRA to veto OSHA’s er-
gonomics standard actually may reinforce the notion that the presi-
dent does not have the power to dictate regulatory decisions by agen-
cies. Otherwise he simply could have directed OSHA to repeal the
standard. If the president has the authority to dictate agency deci-
sions, then it is hard to envision why President Clinton would have
signed the CRA into law. If the president can exert complete control
over agency rulemaking decisions, he would not need a vehicle to re-
225. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–802.
226. Id. § 801(b)(2). In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a
legislative veto of regulations is unconstitutional because it bypassed the president’s role in ap-
proving or disapproving of legislation. Id. at 951–59. The Congressional Review Act avoids this
constitutional problem by providing that joint resolutions of disapproval either must be signed
by the president or enacted over his veto. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3).
227. Steven Greenhouse, House Joins Senate in Repealing Rules on Workplace Injuries,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at A19.
228. Kathy Chen, Effort to Kill Workplace Ergonomics Rules Gains Steam as Bush Gives
Endorsement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2001, at A3.
229. Greenhouse, supra note 227, at A19.
230. David Rogers & Kathy Chen, House Joins Senate in Killing Ergonomics Rules, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 8, 2001, at A2.
231. Greenhouse, supra note 227, at A19.
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peal them. However, the circumstances surrounding the repeal of
OSHA’s ergonomics regulation—occurring in the early days of a new
administration to repeal a rule issued by the outgoing administration
of a president from a different political party232—probably reflects the
already high degree of presidential control over rulemaking. Because
the president can veto resolutions disapproving rules under the CRA,
it is unlikely to be used frequently (OSHA’s ergonomics regulation is
the only one that has been repealed using the CRA) except in cir-
cumstances where a new president seeks to block rules issued by a
prior administration.
The Bush administration continues to conduct regulatory review
under Executive Order 12,866 while developing its own review pro-
gram that is widely expected to subject regulations to more intense
scrutiny. President Bush’s nomination of Harvard professor John
Graham to be OIRA administrator was opposed vigorously by envi-
ronmental and consumer groups that argued that he was too sympa-
thetic to corporate interests.233 On July 19, 2001, the Senate confirmed
Graham’s appointment by a vote of 61-37.234 In an effort to demon-
strate that he plans to be even-handed in conducting regulatory re-
view, Graham has announced that OIRA will issue “prompt” letters
to agencies to direct their attention to issues that deserve greater
regulatory attention.235 In September 2001, OIRA sent prompt letters
to OSHA and to the Department of Health and Human Services.236
The letter to OSHA encouraged the agency to require companies to
use automated external defibrillators to prevent deaths from heart
attacks.237 The letter to the Department of Health and Human Serv-
232. See Chen, supra note 228, at A3.
233. See, e.g., Dick Durbin, Graham Flunks the Cost-Benefit Test, WASH. POST, July 16,
2001, at A15 (explaining Graham’s opposition to private sector regulation based on risk analy-
sis).
234. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 107th Congress—1st Session (July 19, 2001), at http://www.
senate.gov/legislative/vote1071/vote_00242.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
235. See Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to the President’s Management Coun-
cil, regarding Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA, at 5 (Sept. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_review-process.html (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (describing the meaning of “prompt” letters).
236. Ellen Nakashima, OMB Asks Agencies for Action, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at
A30.
237. Id.
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ices encouraged it to require food labeling that would disclose trans-
fatty acid content.238
IV.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Is it legal for the president to dictate the substance of regulatory
decisions that a statute requires an agency head to make? It appears
highly significant that no president has expressly asserted such
authority. Indeed, even though the Clinton administration’s program
provides that disputes between OMB and agencies are to be resolved
by the president, the executive order that creates the program states
that “[n]othing in this order shall be construed as displacing the
agencies’ authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.”239 Thus,
even the Clinton program is founded on the premise that agencies re-
tain responsibility for decisions entrusted to them by law.
The sparse case law in this area makes it clear that the president
does not have the authority to dictate a decision that is not in accor-
dance with the facts in the rulemaking record or the standards re-
quired to be employed by the underlying regulatory statute. How-
ever, it also suggests that if the agency head is persuaded by the
president to adopt as the agency’s own the outcome preferred by the
White House, the decision will not be subject to judicial reversal if it
is consistent with the facts in the rulemaking record and the stan-
dards required by the underlying regulatory statute. If the agency
head is not persuaded by the president, he or she can be fired, subject
to whatever limitations on removal Congress has enacted, but the
president cannot himself issue the regulations adopting his preferred
outcome.
As a practical matter, the president’s ability to fire agency heads
makes it likely that he will win most policy disputes with them. How-
ever, adherence to the view that the president does not have the
authority to dictate decisions entrusted to agency heads by law cre-
ates a distinction that can make a very real difference to policy out-
comes for several reasons. First, there is a substantial political cost to
the president if he has to fire an agency head who disagrees with the
policy outcome the president prefers.240 Because the president has not
been thought to have the power to dictate decisions entrusted to
238. Id.
239. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 9, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000).
240. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 25.
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agencies by law, agency heads have somewhat more power to resist
White House efforts to force them to grant favors to special inter-
ests.241 Precisely because the president’s removal authority is such a
powerful weapon in his arsenal of tools to persuade agencies to ad-
here to his policies, when an executive official refuses to do so, it
usually indicates that some broader principle is at stake. This can
serve as an alarm signal to the public that the president may not be
acting with fidelity to the law or in the best interest of the country.
The Watergate “Saturday Night Massacre” spawned by Presi-
dent Nixon’s efforts to remove Watergate special prosecutor
Archibald Cox illustrates the political costs to the president of having
to fire executive officials to work his will.242 When Cox was appointed,
the Justice Department issued an order granting him the “greatest
degree of independence that is consistent with the Attorney Gen-
eral’s statutory accountability” and pledging that the “Attorney Gen-
eral will not countermand or interfere with the Special Prosecutor’s
decisions or actions.”243 The order also provided that the special
prosecutor would not be removed “except for extraordinary impro-
prieties on his part.”244 Both Attorney General Elliot Richardson and
his deputy William Ruckelshaus resigned rather than carry out the
president’s order to fire Cox, which they viewed as illegal and im-
proper. Robert Bork, who then became acting attorney general,
agreed to carry out the order, though he was unable to make a claim
that Cox’s removal was for “extraordinary improprieties.”245 The po-
litical firestorm that these firings engendered resulted in Cox’s suc-
cessor, Leon Jaworski, being granted by Congress even more sub-
stantial protection from removal.
241. Early in the EPA’s history, a Nixon White House aide asked the EPA to seek a stay of
a court order the EPA had won in one of its first enforcement actions against a company the
president of which was a politically important Republican. The White House backed off after
EPA Administrator William Ruckleshuas threatened to resign “if environmental decisions are
overruled because of political considerations.” QUARLES, supra note 154, at 58–76. EPA Ad-
ministrator Russell Train threatened to resign when the White House sought to force him to
support legislation to weaken the Clean Air Act during the first Arab oil embargo in 1973. Id.
at 141. The White House staff ultimately was forced to back down. Id.
242. For a more complete account of the “Saturday Night Massacre,” see generally KEN
GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 361–72 (1997).
243. Establishing the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688
(June 4, 1973).
244. Id.
245. A suit brought by Ralph Nader and several members of Congress resulted in a judg-
ment that Cox had been discharged illegally. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C.
1973).
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An argument can be made that it makes no difference which
party has the entitlement to decisionmaking authority—the president
or the agency head—because agency officials can either be fired by
the president to achieve his ends or they can resign in protest if a de-
cision they oppose is dictated to them, producing the same policy re-
sult with approximately the same political cost to the president.
However, this is probably a case where the initial assignment of enti-
tlement to make a decision has an impact on bargaining power. If the
president has no right to dictate a decision entrusted by law to an
agency head, the agency head will be bargaining with greater moral
authority than she would have if she knew the president had a right
to dictate the decision. Moreover, because the costs of firing and the
costs of resignation probably differ for each party, there are circum-
stances in which officials would not be fired for making decisions
over which they would not be willing to resign. Thus, a president who
has directive authority should find it easier to persuade agency offi-
cials to accept policies that they would not adopt on their own.
It also can be argued that giving directive authority to a presi-
dent would undermine the value of the Senate’s constitutional func-
tion in providing advice and consent to the president’s appointments
of agency heads. Although presidents tend to appoint officials who
are likely to agree with their policies, the need to obtain their confir-
mation by the Senate can have a substantial impact on the types of
people who ultimately take the helm of executive agencies. If the
president has the legal authority to dictate decisions entrusted to
agencies by law, then it makes little difference whom the president
appoints. Indeed, the White House could assume (at least in theory)
all the functions of an executive agency knowing that the president’s
directive authority makes it irrelevant who the actual decisionmaker
is.
Even those who readily agree that the president is entitled to
appoint cabinet heads who share his philosophy believe that confir-
mation hearings serve a useful function by permitting an exploration
of the “likely regulatory approaches” and “policy background” of the
nominee.246 The confirmation process often is used by members of the
Senate to obtain assurances from prospective agency heads that they
will implement the authorities entrusted to them with some degree of
independence from the president’s political preferences. If the presi-
dent has, and regularly uses, the authority to dictate agency decisions,
246. Dellinger, supra note 3, at A22.
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then it makes less difference who occupies the seat at the cabinet ta-
ble. Thus, in the steel seizure example, if Congress had enacted a
statute authorizing the secretary of commerce to seize the steel mills
if he made certain findings, the mills could be seized only if the secre-
tary of commerce agreed to make the necessary finding. If the secre-
tary refused, he could be fired by the president who would pay a
higher political cost for having to install a replacement official willing
to make the finding.
Once agency officials take office, their institutional responsibili-
ties influence their policy agendas. Although this may make it more
difficult for the president to control what agencies do, it is an entirely
legitimate product of congressional delegations to agencies. When he
was director of OMB during the first Reagan administration, David
Stockman was shocked that many cabinet heads opposed issuance of
Executive Order 12,291 because it threatened their decisionmaking
prerogatives. Stockman had assumed that this was a “safe item” be-
cause “[s]weeping deregulation was another pillar of Reagan’s sup-
ply-side platform” and regulatory review “had become an article of
faith among conservative critics of the regulatory superstate.”247
Stockman concluded that his cabinet colleagues “were ill-schooled in
even the basic tenets of the Reagan Revolution” and were becoming
captives to what he described as the “permanent bureaucracies”
within their agencies.248 In retrospect, Stockman should not have been
surprised that agency heads were simply seeking to defend what they
viewed as their institutional roles. If the president had authority to
dictate agency decisions, he effectively could circumvent the adminis-
trative structure erected by Congress by transferring ultimate deci-
sionmaking authority away from agency heads.
The argument in favor of presidential authority to dictate agency
decisions confronts not only legal difficulties, but also substantial
policy concerns. Although it may have become somewhat old-
fashioned to speak of agency expertise, any effort to involve the
White House in more than a handful of regulatory decisions neces-
sarily must delegate presidential authority to persons who often are
likely to have far less expertise than the agency officials whose deci-
sions they seek to displace. The president simply does not have the
time to be personally involved in any more than a few of the myriad,
247. DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: HOW THE REAGAN REVOLUTION
FAILED 103 (1986).
248. Id.
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complex regulatory issues with which agencies grapple on a daily ba-
sis. Thus, one consequence of efforts by the Clinton administration
and now the George W. Bush administration to assert greater White
House authority over agency policies is that young White House
aides are now trying to give orders to cabinet officials.249
In his book Locked in the Cabinet, President Clinton’s first secre-
tary of labor, Robert Reich, describes how he repeatedly felt bullied
by phone calls from young aides in the White House Office of Cabi-
net Affairs. After being informed that “[t]he White House wants you
to go to Cleveland,” Reich describes his reaction:
Here I am, a member of the president’s cabinet, confirmed by the
Senate, the head of an entire government department with eighteen
thousand employees, responsible for implementing a huge number of
laws and rules, charged with helping people get better jobs, and who
is telling me what to do? Some twerp in the White House who has no
clue what I’m doing in this job. Screw him. I won’t go.250
Similar complaints are now being voiced by members of the
Bush cabinet.251 Although its members include former governors and
senators and top business executives, the Bush cabinet is now viewed
as far less influential than the White House staff in developing policy
initiatives. This perception is reflected in the remark by current cabi-
net member Norman Mineta that “I’m the secretary of the Depart-
ment of Transportation, but I’m still only staff to the president of the
United States.”252
Before Congress made extensive delegations of rulemaking
power and other legal responsibilities directly to agency heads, its
delegations to the president were so extensive as to require the presi-
dent to turn over many functions to subordinate officers. As one
study observed in 1924: “There is no way in which this could be pre-
vented. Were it not for the possibility of devolution in all ordinary
cases we should have to evolve supermen for our Presidents.”253 The
president’s need to delegate responsibilities to subordinates was so
249. This has been a frequent criticism of regulatory review by OMB. See, e.g., Percival,
supra note 130, at 181–82 (describing criticism of OIRA reviews performed by desk officers
who have neither the technical expertise nor the administrative guidance to appropriately re-
view new regulations).
250. ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED IN THE CABINET 109 (1997).
251. Ellen Nakashima & Dana Milbank, Bush Cabinet Takes Back Seat in Driving Policy,
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2001, at A1.
252. Id.
253. HART, supra note 14, at 187.
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acute that an issue frequently addressed by the Supreme Court was
whether agency action could be considered the action of the presi-
dent for purposes of performing functions entrusted to the president
by Congress.254 Some matters were deemed so important that they re-
quired some showing that they had received the personal attention of
the president before they would be deemed valid.255
Elena Kagan argues that a congressional intent to bar the presi-
dent from deciding issues delegated by law to agency heads should
not be inferred from the fact that Congress delegates other functions
to the president. She argues that congressional delegations of
authority to the president have a different effect than delegations to
agency heads because the former enable the president to choose who
the initial decisionmaker will be.256 Kagan argues that the fact that
Congress has chosen to delegate some responsibilities directly to
agency heads means only that Congress has placed initial responsi-
bility on the agency head, but not necessarily that it intended to fore-
close the president from taking ultimate responsibility for the deci-
sion.257 Yet there are some circumstances in which Congress has
specified that the legal effects of certain decisions entrusted to agency
heads may be suspended by the president upon a finding of some sort
of national emergency.258 If the president has express authority to
overturn the legal consequences of agency decisions in some circum-
stances, but not others, the argument for inferring congressional in-
tent to permit the president generally to displace agency decisions is
somewhat weaker.
254. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839) (explaining that an order
by the War Department reserving public lands from sale is “in legal contemplation the act of
the President” because “[t]he President speaks and acts through the heads of the several de-
partments in relation to subjects which appertain to their respective duties”); see also Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 467–70 (1900) (affirming a district court order releasing from the cus-
tody of state law enforcement officers an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent who refused to
hand over to state officials private business records pursuant to federal regulations limiting the
use of such records by the IRS).
255. See, e.g., Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557–61 (1887) (requiring that for a
sentence of a court martial to be valid, it has to be shown to represent the personal decision of
the president).
256. Kagan, supra note 133, at 2329.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 107(f), 91 Stat. 691–93 (1977) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f) (1994)) (allowing the president, and only the president, to de-
termine that a national or regional energy emergency of such severity exists that portions of
applicable state air quality controls can be suspended).
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A major argument used by proponents of presidential authority
to dictate agency decisions is that such authority will foster greater
accountability by making it clear that the president bears the ultimate
responsibility for regulatory decisions and by making the bureaucracy
more accountable to a nationally elected official. However, it also can
be argued that by allowing the president to countermand agency de-
cisions, accountability would be blurred because in many cases the
public would be unable to understand whether a decision was the
product of the agency’s expertise or a presidential directive. One
criticism of the OMB review process during the Reagan and George
H. W. Bush administrations is that the process often forced agencies
to alter their policies to satisfy OMB’s preferences without the re-
sponsible persons’ leaving any fingerprints. Former EPA Deputy
Administrator John Quarles argues that
it is preferable to rely on the political process to hold the Adminis-
trator accountable rather than to create complex mechanisms which
attempt to establish additional checks and balances within the execu-
tive branch, but which also inevitably fragment responsibility and in
the end undermine achievement of the very accountability for which
those mechanisms are established.259
The Supreme Court has stated that when one level of govern-
ment “commandeers” the regulatory process of another by compel-
ling it to adopt unpopular regulations, the political accountability of
both is diminished, because the officials whose decisionmaking proc-
esses are commandeered “will bear the brunt of public disapproval,”
while the officials who compelled the unpopular action “may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”260 Thus,
the Court concluded that federal officials had to at least give states a
choice whether to regulate on their own, even if the threat of losing
federal funds or having the federal government regulate in lieu of the
state were very likely to persuade the state to act. Although the im-
pact of presidential involvement in agency decisions on accountabil-
ity may turn in large part on what sort of public disclosure is re-
quired, the Court’s logic suggests that allowing the president to
dictate decisions by agency heads may raise accountability concerns.
Some agency heads have been very successful in using publicity to
259. Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 96th Cong. 4 (1979)
(statement of John Quarles, Deputy Director, EPA).
260. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).
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rally public support for their preferred decisionmaking outcomes. If
the president can secretly dictate the decisions they must make, ac-
countability could suffer.
If the president had the authority to dictate regulatory decisions
to agency heads, there is reason to suspect that the White House
would be more inclined to intervene to achieve short-term political
gains than to promote the objectives of regulatory statutes Congress
has entrusted agencies to administer. Had the White House been able
to dictate regulatory decisions, the world would be very different to-
day. The EPA’s initial effort to limit levels of lead additives in gaso-
line might never have gotten off the ground,261 and, even if it had, the
limits probably would have been abandoned in 1982 when the Vice-
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief advised the EPA to
eliminate them.262 Warning labels would not have been mandated for
cigarettes in 1965 if the Federal Trade Commission had acceded to a
White House request to abandon the rulemaking that spurred enact-
ment of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.263
Workers in the textile industry would not have the full benefits of
OSHA’s cotton dust standard.264 These are only some of the many
regulations that have produced enormous net benefits to society, but
that the White House sought to block or weaken.
The Clinton administration’s experience demonstrates that
presidential review of rulemaking need not be biased against regula-
tion. President Clinton used the energy of his office to focus agencies’
attention on problems that he felt were not being adequately ad-
dressed. Early indications suggest that the George W. Bush admini-
stration may take a similar approach toward regulatory review by is-
suing “prompt” letters to suggest problems deserving of agency
attention.
Attitudes toward presidential involvement in rulemaking are in-
escapably shaped by one’s views concerning the desirability of regula-
tion, the quality of decisionmaking by regulatory agencies, and the
objectives served by regulatory review. Critics of regulation and
261. QUARLES, supra note 154, at 117–42.
262. Percival, supra note 130, at 187–88.
263. See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 269 (1996) (reporting that White House of-
ficials asked Rand Dixon, chairman of the FTC, to halt the FTC rulemaking process that would
have resulted in a warning label requirement). At the time, President Johnson’s close friend,
Abe Fortas, who later became a Supreme Court Justice, was working as one of the principal
Washington lobbyists for the Philip Morris Company. Id. at 270.
264. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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regulatory agencies typically portray them as vehicles for special in-
terest “rent seeking,”265 while environmental and consumer groups
portray them as champions of the public interest. Prior to the Clinton
administration, virtually all presidential involvement in rulemaking
was designed primarily to make it more difficult for agencies to
regulate to reduce costs to industry, rather than to achieve its pur-
ported goal of increasing the net benefits of regulation to society.266
The Clinton administration pursued a more balanced approach in
which the president also sought to spur agencies to take action.267
CONCLUSION
Each of the regulatory review programs established by every
president since Richard Nixon has been founded on the notion that
the president should play an advisory and consultative role in super-
vising rulemaking by executive agencies. By this view, the president
may advise agency heads concerning his views on particular rules, but
the president has no authority to dictate regulatory decisions en-
trusted to them by law. This Essay argues that this understanding is
well grounded in the Constitution, the history of Congress’s creation
of executive agencies, and the sparse judicial precedents concerning
the limits of presidential power. Because the president has the
authority to fire agency heads, he can have substantial influence over
their decisions. He may persuade agency heads to change their minds
about regulatory decisions so long as the rules they adopt are sup-
ported by evidence in the rulemaking record and are consistent with
standards required by the underlying regulatory statute. But the
agency head retains the ultimate authority for regulatory decisions
entrusted to her by law, and the president may not dictate what her
decision will be.
This results in a less unitary executive than envisioned by those
who argue that independent agencies violate constitutional principles
265. See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray, Special Interests, Regulation, and the Separation of Powers,
in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra
note 10, at 211, 214–21 (describing several examples of concentrated benefits to special inter-
ests in the regulation of, among other things, sulfur emissions from coal-fired power plants, air-
bags in cars, and the drug approval process).
266. Percival, supra note 130, at 184–89.
267. See generally Kagan, supra note 133 (arguing that the Clinton administration’s ap-
proach to regulatory review “provoked fewer confrontations” than previous administrations’
approaches but “articulated a broader understanding of the President’s appropriate authority
to direct administrative actions”).
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of separation of powers and that the president should have the
authority to dictate decisions by all executive officers (views under-
mined by recent Supreme Court decisions). It also represents sound
policy that accommodates the interests of Congress and the president
in their continuing competition for influence over regulatory policy,
while providing a check on presidential abuse of power.
As the sparse judicial precedents indicate, the judiciary will tread
lightly when addressing issues of presidential power. The Constitu-
tion is purposefully vague in many regards, a fact that facilitates con-
tinuing competition between the three branches of government for
influence over regulatory policy. Whether envisioned by the Framers
or not, this competition is a healthy development that illustrates the
vitality and adaptability of the nation’s structure of government and
the system of checks and balances that prevents any single branch
from overreaching.
A president who could dictate regulatory outcomes would not
need all the vigor and energy that the Framers sought to give the of-
fice when investing it with the executive power. Nor would the presi-
dent be as inclined to listen to dissent from cabinet officers who may
have valuable ideas.268 One important reason presidents like Theo-
dore Roosevelt and Bill Clinton were successful in mobilizing the ex-
ecutive branch to pursue their regulatory agendas is because of their
extraordinary powers of persuasion. Political scientist Richard Neus-
tadt captured it best when he wrote that presidential power “is the
power to persuade.”269 Although external events can have a dramatic
impact on the extent of presidential power, a president who wishes to
play an active role in management of the administrative state must be
prepared to use the formidable powers of persuasion the presidency
provides.
Near the close of his first year in office, President George W.
Bush has just made two highly controversial decisions that raise fun-
damental questions concerning presidential authority and the use of
executive orders. On November 1, 2001, the president issued Execu-
tive Order 13,233, which asserts that the sitting president has the
authority to control the release of presidential papers from both cur-
268. See, e.g., Stephen Power, Transportation Secretary Opposes Private Air-Traffic Control
System, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at B2 (reporting Transportation Secretary Norman
Mineta’s opposition to the privatization of the air-traffic control system, “a stance potentially at
odds” with the George W. Bush administration).
269. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 11
(1990).
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rent and past administrations.270 This action, which effectively
blocked the imminent public release of documents from the Reagan
administration, outraged historians who argue that it conflicts with
the mandate of the Presidential Records Act that such papers pre-
sumptively be released after twelve years have elapsed.271
Even more controversial is a presidential directive issued on No-
vember 13, 2001, authorizing military tribunals to try noncitizens sus-
pected of involvement in terrorism.272 Asserting “that it is not practi-
cable to apply” normal “principles of law and the rules of evidence”
to such cases, the directive specifies that the secretary of defense may
determine how to conduct trials before military tribunals that may
convict defendants by a two-thirds vote.273 The directive expressly
prohibits defendants from seeking any legal redress in any federal or
state court, or before any international tribunal. This breathtakingly
broad assertion of presidential authority, undertaken without con-
sulting Congress, raises extremely serious constitutional questions.274
How Congress and the judiciary respond to these assertions of presi-
dential authority will help shape not only the future balance of power
between branches of government in our constitutional system, but
also the extent of freedom enjoyed by those for whose benefit that
system was erected.
270. Exec. Order No. 13,233 § 3(d)(1), (2), 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025, 56,026–27 (Nov. 1, 2001).
271. See, e.g., Richard Reeves, Writing History to Executive Order, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2001, at A25 (defending the value of open records in recording presidential decisionmaking).
272. Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1665 (Nov. 19, 2001).
273. Id. at 1666.
274. The directive has provoked harsh criticism from diverse quarters. See, e.g., Harold
Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39
(criticizing President George W. Bush’s use of military tribunals and suggesting that trials be-
fore civilian courts would deliver fair and swift justice); Robert A. Levy, Don’t Shred the Con-
stitution to Fight Terror, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2001, at A18 (asserting that the use of military
tribunals represents a likely unconstitutional overreaching by President George W. Bush).
